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ABSTRACT
DESIGNING A FACE DETECTION CAPTCHA
Adam C. Day
Completely Automated Tests for Telling Computers and Humans Apart (CAPTCHAs) are quickly
becoming a standard for security in every online interface that could be the subject to spam or
other exploitation. The majority of today's CAPTCHA technologies rely on text-based images, which
present the user with a string of distorted characters and asks the user to type out the characters.
The problem with CAPTCHAs is that they are often difficult to solve and can generally be
successfully defeated using techniques such as segmentation and optical character recognition. We
introduce an image face recognition based CAPTCHA which presents the user with a series of
distorted images and the question of deciding which of these images contain a human face. The user
is required to click on all presented face images in order to successfully pass the CAPTCHA. The
concept relies on the strength of the human ability to detect a face even amongst heavy distortion
as well as the inaccuracies and short-comings of face recognition software. The CAPTCHA
application was designed with a web interface and deployed on West Virginia University's
Computer Science 101 attendance website. To test the success of the CAPTCHA, data for human
success rates was compared alongside facial recognition software which attempted to solve the
CAPTCHA. The results of the data gathered during testing not only prove the feasibility of face
recognition based CAPTCHAs in general, but also provide valuable data regarding human versus
computer recognition rates under varying types of image distortion.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 CAPTCHAS
1.1.1

WHAT IS A CAPTCHA?
Although most people are not familiar with term CAPTCHA, many use them on weekly or

even daily basis. CAPTCHAs are the security tests that are most often found on websites that
require the use of registration. These security tests often consist of a series of distorted characters
that the user must type in order to continue onto the desired location. The purpose of the CAPTCHA
is to restrict access to a website or other form of resource to ensure that the access is being
performed by a human rather than an automated computer system. In its simplest form, a
CAPTCHA is a method for telling humans and computers apart. The term CAPTCHA stands for a
"Completely Automated Public Turing Test to Tell Computers and Humans Apart" [1]. The term
"Turing Test" refers to a game in which a human judge would ask a number of questions to a
human and a computer player without knowing which player was the computer and which was
human [2]. The judge would then have to determine which player was the human player and which
was the computer player. In the case of a CAPTCHA, the judge is no longer a human, but is instead
the computer server hosting the CAPTCHA; this computer must make the determination of whether
the user is human or computer.

1

1.1.2 COMMON USES FOR CAPTCHAS
The most common use of CAPTCHAs today is to protect websites from the automation of
registration of accounts or other spam. CAPTCHAs are commonly found on websites that provide
web-based e-mail services, forums, comment boxes or polls. In the case of e-mail services, the
CAPTCHA prevents the automated registration of accounts, which could then be used to send junk
e-mail or for other nefarious purposes. When CAPTCHAs are not put in place on forums and
comment boxes, automated attacks can overrun these systems with unsolicited advertisements.
The need for CAPTCHAs in polls is shown in the November 1999 poll on slashdot.com, which asked
which was the best graduate school in computer science [1]. In this poll, both MIT and CMU created
automated programs to vote for their own school [1].
While CAPTCHAs are used to prevent the generation of spam, they can also be used to
prevent the receipt of spam. A common method of preventing internet spam is to only allow the
receipt of e-mails by individuals on the recipient's contact list. The problem with this method is that
it can often block legitimate e-mail as well. One approach to solving this issue is an application
called Spam Arrest, which sends a reply e-mail to anyone who e-mails you that is not on your
contact list [3]. In this reply e-mail, a CAPTCHA is sent, and upon successfully solving that
CAPTCHA, the original sender is added to the original recipient's contact list. In this case, an
automated spammer would generally ignore all incoming e-mail, while a legitimate user would
reply to the e-mail.
Another common use for CAPTCHAs is to prevent the automated use of a wordlist to break
usernames and passwords; this form of attack is often referred to as a dictionary attack [4]. On
websites requiring the use of a username and password, if there is no means to slow down or
prevent automated access, an attacker can simply iterate through a list of common usernames and
password variations in an attempt to guess a user's login information. When adding a CAPTCHA to
2

the login system, the user is often required to solve a CAPTCHA after the second or third failed
login. While this may present a slight annoyance to a human user who cannot remember his
password, it prevents the use of an automated attack.

1.1.3 CLASSIFICATIONS OF CAPTCHAS
While the most recognized type of CAPTCHA today is the distorted-text CAPTCHA,
CAPTCHAs continue to evolve and change in an attempt to create a more secure design. CAPTCHAs
not only involve the use of text, but commonly involve the use of images, audio and even video.

Text-based CAPTCHAs
Text-based CAPTCHAs are the most common and oldest form of CAPTCHA. In a text-based
CAPTCHA, a sequence of characters is generated and then distorted in a manner that prevents the
use of automated techniques. The user is then presented with this sequence of characters and asked
to type out the characters. If the user types out the correct sequence of characters within a
designated margin of error, then the CAPTCHA is considered to be correctly solved. The advantages
of text-based CAPTCHAs are that optical character recognition (OCR) attacks are well understood,
humans perform character recognition well, there are adequate character combinations, there are
few localization issues, and the design is easily understood and can be generated quickly [5].
One of the first implementations of a text-based CAPTCHA was developed in 1997 by
AltaVista, that needed a method for preventing the automatic adding of URLs to the website for
indexing [6]. The original intent of the service was to provide website owners a method for
submitting their site's URL so that the search engine could index their website Attackers soon
realized that they could automate these submissions to skew the results of the search engine [6].
This early CAPTCHA introduced the basic concept of a text-based CAPTCHA, which involves the use
of a random string of characters placed on a background and then rendered into an actual image.
An example of the CAPTCHA is shown in Fig. 1.
3

Fig. 1. Example AltaVista CA
APTCHA

O of the first ongoing research effforts involveed in CAPTC
One
CHAs was GIIMPY, which
h was
originally
y designed by
b researcheers at CMU to assist Yaahoo! in its problem of bots using their
chatroom
ms to advertiise websites [6]. This CA
APTCHA invo
olved the use of words selected
s
from
m the
English dictionary,
d
which
w
were th
hen distorted
d and placed
d over a rand
dom background [6]. Thee user
then had to type a certain numbeer of these words.
w
An exaample of the GIMPY CAPT
TCHA is show
wn in
Fig. 2.

Fig. 2. Exam
mple GIMPY CAP
PTCHA

O of the mo
One
ost quickly growing CAPT
TCHAs today
y is reCAPTCHA [7]. reCA
APTCHA worrks by
taking words
w
from scanned
s
textt from bookss and displaaying them to
t the user to solve [7]. The
system em
mploys the use
u of a word
d that was no
ot successfullly recognizeed during scaanning alongg with
a controll word [7]. If
I the user ty
ypes the con
ntrol word correctly,
c
theen they are assumed to have
correctly solved the CAPTCHA. By
B presentin
ng two word
ds, the systeem is then able
a
to gatheer an
increasin
ngly large nu
umber of ansswers for th
he unknown words untill it can corrrectly assum
me the
correct teext for the un
nknown worrds. This systtem works to
o solve one of
o the key problems with
h text-
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APTCHAs as the text used has alread
dy failed statte-of-the-art OCR techniq
ques. reCAPT
TCHA
based CA
also work
ks to put CA
APTCHAs to good use by
y helping to digitize
d
text that would otherwise not
n be
digitized.. An examplee of reCAPTC
CHA is shown
n in Fig. 3.

Fig. 3. Exam
mple reCAPTCHA
A Image

W the proggression of text-based
With
t
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APTCHAs haas also come the progression of CAPT
TCHA
attacks. [8],[9],[10]
[
all
a present techniques forr breaking visual text-bassed CAPTCHA
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t be securee. One of thee common teechniques aggainst text-baased CAPTCH
HAs is the use
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segmentaation algorith
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on algorithms work by employing
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ng displayed [5]. The adv
vancement of
o CAPTCHA attacks
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the creatiion of non-trraditional CA
APTCHA typees such as im
mage, audio and
a video-based CAPTCH
HAs in
an attemp
pt to create a more securre CAPTCHA.

Image-b
based CAPT
TCHAs
Im
mage-based CAPTCHAs generally
g
rely on the co
oncept of im
mage classificcation, wherre the
user musst identify an
a image or group of im
mages. In so
ome forms of
o this CAPT
TCHA, the usser is
required to type out or
o select a lab
bel which maatches the im
mages presen
nted. One exaample of thiss type
of CAPTC
CHA is ESP-P
PIX, which prresents the user
u
with 4 images and asks
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o text-based labeling and
a
a relativ
vely small liist of labels. An example of an ESP
P-PIX
the use of
CAPTCHA
A is shown in
n Fig. 4.

Fig. 4. Example ESP-PIIX

In
n another form of imagee-based CAPT
TCHA the usser is requireed to click or
o select all of
o the
CAPTCHA
As that matcch a particullar label. On
ne example of
o this type of CAPTCHA
A is Asirra, which
w
stands for Animal Speecies Image Recognition
R
for Restricting Access [1
12]. In this CA
APTCHA, thee user
is requireed to select all
a of the picttures of catss among pictu
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number of issues co
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As by havingg a large en
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database (over 3 miillion imagess from petfinder.com) th
hat grows on
o a daily basis and by only
presentin
ng a small peercentage of that databasse to the pub
blic at any giv
ven time [13]. However, it has
been shown in [14], that
t
a classifiier has been designed thaat can tell caats and dogs apart with 82.7%
8
accuracy which could
d then be useed to defeat this CAPTCH
HA. An exam
mple of an Asirra CAPTCHA is
shown in
n Fig. 5.
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Fig. 5. Exam
mple Asirra CAP
PTCHA

Video-b
based CAPT
TCHAs
A
Another
progression from
m text-based CAPTCHAs is
i the use off video in CAPTCHA desiggn. In
video-bassed CAPTCH
HAs, users are
a generally
y required to determin
ne keywordss or labels for a
particular video. The most prev
valent work
k involving the use of video-based
d CAPTCHAss was
performeed in [15], wh
here users were
w
asked to
o watch videos and label them with descriptive
d
w
words.
It was also shown in
n [15] that th
his type of CAPTCHA
C
caan compete with
w
image-b
based CAPTCHAs
based on human vs. computer succcess rates off 90% and 13
3%, respectiv
vely.

Audio-b
based CAPT
TCHAs
A
Although
visu
ual-based CAPTCHAs may
y be accessib
ble to the majority of com
mputer users,, they
remain in
naccessible to those userrs who are viisually impaiired. To overrcome this sh
hortcoming, many
m
websites have implem
mented audiio CAPTCHAs which pressent the user with a num
mber of worrds or
characterrs in an audio
o file and ask
k the user to type back what
w
was hearrd. Unfortun
nately, these audio
a
CAPTCHA
As have receiived the sam
me treatmentt as more traditional CAP
PTCHAs and have
h
been su
ubject
to numerrous attacks [16],[17],[18
8]. For exam
mple, in [16] the
t audio CA
APTCHAs on websites su
uch as
Google and
a
Digg weere attacked using popu
ular techniques for speech extraction and achieved
success rates of up to 71%.
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1.2 MOTIVATION AND OUTLINE
Even with the great progression of CAPTCHAs in the last decade, new attacks are created
which circumvent even some of the most advanced techniques. Attacks involving OCR and machinelearning segmentation methods have plagued what were once thought to be the most secure of
CAPTCHA designs. Because of the growing number of issues with text-based CAPTCHAs there has
been a progression of CAPTCHAs moving from text-based to image-based designs. There is still
much room for growth in image-based CAPTCHA design. There is very little data regarding human
vs. computer ability to solve image-based techniques. With the progression of image-based designs
will follow the progression of image distortion techniques. In cases like Asirra, where classifiers
have been designed to identify images, image distortion techniques can be applied lower the
success rate of such attacks. There has also been little research involving the use of image quality
metrics to analyze the effects of non-traditional distortions which could prove useful in the general
design of CAPTCHAs.
Additionally, there has been little research regarding the use of face detection in CAPTCHA
design. In [19], a face recognition CAPTCHA is designed which presents several techniques
involving the use of faces. In the first presented scheme, the user is required to recognize the same
image using multiple distortions. This scheme has issues regarding the use of the same base image
multiple times in a single CAPTCHA, which could make for easier automated detection. In the
second scheme, multiple photos of one person under various distortions are presented [19]. While
both of these techniques involve the use of faces, no data is presented regarding the usability of
different types of distortions or the success rates of such a CAPTCHA. The paper provides a general
proof of concept, but provides little detail regarding the feasibility or efficiency of such a concept.
In this research we present a clickable, image-based CAPTCHA based on the concepts of face
detection. In our scheme we present the user with a number of distorted face and non-face images
8

and ask the user to click on all of the face images. The primary goal is to design a face-detection
CAPTCHA and prove its ability to compete with other modern CAPTCHAs. We also wish to provide
data regarding how image quality metrics respond to traditional and non-traditional distortion
types and how this data can be used to better design image-based CAPTCHAs. Additionally, we wish
to test our CAPTCHA design against computerized face-detection techniques and determine the
success rates of a computer-based attack. Finally, we aim to provide some insights on the success
rates of humans and computers based on the types of distortions used. This data can then be used
in future research to design distortions that makes computer detection challenging, while allowing
humans to provide correct responses.
The thesis is organized as follows:
•

Chapters 2 and 3 present general background information for the understanding of
image quality metrics and image distortions.

•

Chapter 4 completely describes the face-detection CAPTCHA design and goes
through each step of the CAPTCHA generation.

•

Chapter 5 presents the results of the image quality metrics as well as the human and
computer results.

•

Chapter 6 presents the conclusions and potential for future work.

9

Chapter 2
IMAGE QUALITY METRICS
2.1 INTRODUCTION TO QUALITY METRICS
In order to apply an appropriate level of distortion to an image, it is necessary to determine
the amount of perceivable distortion. To determine an acceptable level of perceptual distortion, the
level of distortion must be verified. Visual image quality is determined using image quality metrics,
which often involve the comparison of an original image and a modified image to determine the
correlation between the two images. Quality metrics fall into two general categories, subjective
metrics and objective metrics.

2.2 SUBJECTIVE METRICS
Subjective image quality metrics involve the use of human testers to visually analyze the
quality of a particular image. One such method is the MOS (Mean Opinion Score), which is
commonly used in testing audio quality as well as image/video quality. The MOS involves asking
human testers to rate the signal's quality on a scale of 1-5. Once the results from all testers are
compiled, the mean of these scores is then taken to form the MOS. Since the subjective tests are
based on human responses to image quality, the results of these metrics are the best in determining
the true visual quality of an image. The downside of these subjective methods is that in order to
achieve accurate results, a large sample of testers is required to analyze a large number of images.
Because of the cost and time required to perform such tests, it is much more practical to use
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objective automated image quality metrics. In the next section we will provide an overview of
commonly used objective image quality metrics.

2.3 OBJECTIVE METRICS
Objective image quality metrics are commonly broken down into conventional signal
quality measures, which analyze the amount of energy in a particular signal and more modern
metrics, which often involve the use of structural properties and/or HVS (Human Visual System)
properties. The methods based on the Human Visual System properties can be further broken down
into those which are based on the low-level properties of the HVS and those which are based more
on high-level properties, such as the general structure of the image.

2.3.1 CONVENTIONAL STATISTICS ORIENTED METRICS
The most commonly known of the conventional signal quality measures is the MSE (Mean
Squared Error), which measures the energy of the distortion. The MSE simply works by averaging
the square of the differences in pixel intensity values between two images. The MSE for twodimensional image can be written as follows:

=

1

‖ ( , ) − ( , )‖

(2.1)

where I(i,j) and K(i,j) are the two m x n images. In the case of testing distortions, I(i,j) is the original
image and K(i,j) is the modified image.
Another metric based on the energy of distortion is the PSNR (Peak Signal-to-Noise Ratio), which
measures the ratio of the maximum intensity value to the amount of noise present in the image. The
PSNR is based on the MSE and can be written as follows:
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= 20 ∙

√

(2.2)

where MAXI represents the maximum possible pixel value. In most grayscale images, MAXI is equal
to 255.
Although it is one of the most commonly used methods in determining the quality of a
signal, some studies have shown that that the MSE does not perform well in determining the loss of
perceptual quality [20][21]. It is shown in [21] that the MSE can result in nearly identical values for
images with widely varying degrees of image quality. In [22], it was shown that the PSNR performs
well in tests involving the use of Gaussian noise, and has indistinguishable results in this category in
comparison to advanced HVS-based metrics. Because of the weaknesses found in the MSE and
corresponding PSNR, methods incorporating the use of the human visual system have been
developed in an effort to improve the ability to correctly measure perceptual image degradation.
Although these newer methods generally provide much greater results over a wide range of quality
tests, the MSE and PSNR do perform well considering their simplicity in implementation.

2.3.2 LOW-LEVEL HVS METRICS
Low-level HVS metrics take into account how visually perceptive a distortion is through the
use of models to characterize HVS properties such as contrast sensitivity and perceived image
contrast. These metrics often take into account the visibility of distortion under multiple viewing
conditions to determine the overall quality of the distorted image in relation to the source image.
While it is advantageous that these metrics have the ability to be adapted for specific platforms, it
also presents a downside in that they often have to be adjusted for each implementation or require
the use of training data.
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Noise Quality Measure
One algorithm based on low-level properties of the HVS is the noise quality measure (NQM).
This quality metric performs modifications to the image in order to simulate the appearance to a
human [23]. The NQM is based on the idea that the psychovisual effects of image filtering and noisebased distortion are separate [23]. The NQM works by first passing both the original and modified
images through a contrast pyramid, based on [24], which computes the contrast of an image while
taking into account various visual effects [23]. After being passed through the contrast pyramid, the
NQM is then found by computing the signal-to-noise ratio of both the source and distorted images
after they have been restored using a restoration algorithm [23]. In doing so, both images are
analyzed as if they were viewed by a human. The NQM differs from many other methods in the fact
that it involves the use of analyzing a modified original image.
The NQM can be written as follows:

(

where

) = 10

∑ ∑
∑ ∑

( , )

( , )− ( , )

(2.3)

( , ) represents the model restored image and ( , ), which represents the restored

distorted image [23].

VSNR
The VSNR (Visual Signal-to-Noise Ratio) works by modeling the masking effects which
cause difficulty in detecting distortions, the perceived contrast of distortions and the structural
degradation of the image [25]. It is a wavelet-based method that takes advantage of both low and
mid-level HVS properties. The VSNR works by first measuring the contrast thresholds for the
detection of distortion in the image. The distortion is then measured and if the detected distortion
is found to be below the determined threshold, the image is given a perfect VSNR rating. If the
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distortions are found to be above the threshold, then the low-level property of perceived contrast
and mid-level property of global precedence are measured and modeled as Euclidean distances
[25]. The linear sum of these two distances is then used to determine the VSNR. The advantages of
the VSNR are a low computational complexity, low memory requirements, the use of a model based
on luminance and the ability to compensate for a variety of viewing angles and conditions. It was
shown in [25] that the VSNR is competitive with many of the other modern metrics, but that it is
extremely sensitive to geometric distortion and transformation.
The VSNR can be written as follows:

= 10

VD = αd

(

( )
)
( )

+ (1 − α)

d
√2

(2.4)

(2.5)

where C(I) represents the RMS contrast of the original image I, α represents the contribution of
each Euclidean distance, dpc is the amount of perceived contrast of the distortions and dgp is the
amount of disruption caused to the global precedence.

2.3.3 HIGH-LEVEL HVS METRICS
In general, algorithms based on high-level HVS properties perform quality assessment
based on the overall structure of an image. Among these methods are the UQI (Universal Quality
Index) [21], the SSIM (Structural SIMilarity) [20] and the VIF (Visual Information Fidelity) models
[26].
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UQI
Both the UQI and the SSIM have strengths that lie in their relationship to the Human Visual
System and its analysis of the structural integrity of an image on a local level. These metrics do not
specifically use a particular HVS-based model, but instead work by analyzing the high-level
properties of an image. They work by taking into consideration the two images' differences in linear
correlation, luminance and contrast [21]. The UQI for an original image, x, and a modified image, y,
can be written as follows:

=

∙

2
( ) +( )

∙

2
+

(2.6)

where:
x = x |i = 1,2, … , N}

(1.1)

y = y |i = 1,2, … , N}

(1.1)

̅=

=

σ =

1

(1.2)

1

1
−1
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(1.3)

(

− x)

(1.4)

σ =

σ

=

1
−1

1
−1

− x) (

(

(1.5)

− y)

(

− y)

(1.6)

Each multiplicative term in the UQI represents one of the three components being analyzed to
measure the differences between two images. The first component of the product term represents
the linear correlation between x and y and takes on a range from -1 to +1 [21]. The second
component of the product term represents the difference between the mean luminance of x and y
and takes on a value between 0 and 1 [21]. The third component of the product term represents the
difference in contrast and takes on a value between 0 and 1 [21]. The UQI is important because it
forms the basis for the framework for the SSIM and other structural-based image quality metrics.

SSIM
The SSIM was introduced in [20] as a general form of the UQI. While both metrics are very
similar in origin, the SSIM is preferred over the UQI due to the UQI's instability when

+

( ) + ( ) approaches 0. The SSIM can be written as:
( , )= ( , )

∙

( , )

∙

( , )

(1.7)

where

( , )=

( , )=

+

2
+

+

2
+
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+

+

(1.8)

(1.9)

or

( , )=
and

are equivalent to ̅ and

from the UQI.

previously mentioned instability.

,

of pixel values for the image and

≪ 1 and

+
+

2

(1.10)

=(

) represents a constant to prevent the

can be represented as

variables α, β and γ are set equal to 1 and

=

=(

) . L represents the range

≪ 1 are generic constants. In [20], the weighting
/2 to simplify the expression, giving the resulting

equation for the SSIM:

( , )=

2

+

+

+

2

+
+

+

(1.11)

The SSIM expression is then applied to the image using a sliding window in order to
determine the local SSIM. The average of the SSIM values are then used to determine the overall
image quality.
In general, the SSIM improves greatly on traditional methods such as the MSE, but does not
do well in spatial related image modifications. For example, the SSIM yields better results for
images with intensity modifications over images which have been spatially shifted, which is not
consistent with human results [27].
In order to improve upon the SSIM, several modified versions of the SSIM have been
proposed in hopes of solving some of the SSIM's inadequacies. In [28] the MS-SSIM* is introduced in
order to improve upon the previous fix to the limitation found in the UQI. [28] also analyzes the
ability of image-quality metrics to predict the threshold capability of a particular image. To improve
upon the areas of translation, scaling and rotation, the concepts of the SSIM were applied in the
wavelet domain to create the Complex Wavelet-SSID (CW-SSIM) in [29]. Additionally, in [30] a
Multi-Scale SSIM (MS-SSIM) is introduced, which improves the SSIM's ability to handle varying
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resolutions and viewing distance. The multi-scale aspect of the MS-SSIM works by taking both the
original and the modified image, applying a low-pass filter and then down-sampling the resulting
images by a factor of 2. This operation is performed M-1 times, with each operation representing a
particular scale factor. At the jth scale, the previously mentioned c(x,y) and s(x,y) are each computed
and written as cj(x,y) and sj(x,y). The luminance comparison is taken at the highest scale (M) and is
written as lM(x,y). The new form of the SSIM is written as follows:

.

( , )=

( , )

∙

( , )

( , )

(1.12)

IFC
Although the IFC (Information Fidelity Criterion) metric is similar to conventional models in
its analysis of images purely as signals, its strengths lie in its use of NSS (Natural Scene Statistics)
models. Natural scene images generally are thought of as those images captured from cameras,
camcorders and similar devices. Natural scene images do not include images such as paintings,
computer-generated images and other images not found naturally in the world. The IFC metric
works by modeling the image using NSS models and then analyzing the distortion of the image after
it passes through a distortion channel. The IFC models the source images using the wavelet-based
GSM (Gaussian Scale Mixtures) model [31]. The GSM model is described in detail in [32]. The
wavelet-based distortion model used in [31] works by analyzing the amount of blur and additive
noise found in the channel. The resultant IFC is then a measurement of the mutual information
found between the source and received image. Some features of the IFC are that it does not involve
the use of parameters or training data and works on all viewing platforms. A disadvantage of the
IFC (and other metrics based on this model) is the computational complexity involved in
performing the wavelet decomposition, which causes a significant increase in computation time
when compared to previously discussed methods.
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The IFC can be expressed as:

,

=

,

;

|

,

(1.13)

∈

where

(

;

|

1
2

)=

1+

(1.14)

C represents a GSM modeling of the signal, D represents the distortion model and S represents the
source model.

is the variance of a zero-mean Gaussian Random Field used for modeling the

source model and

is the variance of a zero-mean Gaussian Random Field used for modeling the

distortion model. The IFC is further explained in the details of the VIF.

VIF
In [26], the VIF (Visual Information Fidelity) is introduced, which introduces some
improvements to the IFC by means of normalization. The VIF essentially takes the result of the IFC
and normalizes it by the reference information in order to adjust for variation in the amount of
perceptual image distortion that a particular image may hold [26].
The source model of the VIF/IFC is expressed as:
=

∙

∙

(1.15)

:

where S is a random field of positive scalars, U is a zero-mean Gaussian random field with
covariance CU and I is the image [26].
The distortion model of the VIF/IFC is expressed as:
=

+

=
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+

:

(1.16)

where C is a random field from the source signal, G is a deterministic scalar gain field, I is the image
and V is a Gaussian noise field with a mean of zero and a covariance C = σ I [26].
The VIF can be expressed as:

=

∑

∈

∑

∈

,

;

,

|

,

,
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,

(1.17)

where

;

;

|

|

=

=

1
2

(1.18)

1+

1
2

1+

+

(1.19)

The information in the numerator of the VIF represents the visual information that can be extracted
from the received image, while the information in the denominator is the normalization factor,
which represents the information that can be extracted from the source image. Tests in [26]
showed that while the VIF has issues regarding computation time, it does perform on par with or
better than the PSNR and SSIM and that it performs exceptionally well in tests involving multiple
forms of distortion.

2.3.4 METRIC PERFORMANCE
In [22] a test of full reference image quality metrics was performed on 29 source images
and a 779 resultant distorted images. The tests performed include JPEG2000/JPEG compression,
white noise, Gaussian blur, and the simulation of distortion via a fast fading Rayleigh channel. The
results of the test found that the SSIM-MS, IFC and VIF outperformed all other grayscale oriented
algorithms. The test also showed that among the 10 different metrics tested, that the VIF yielded
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the most accurate results among the tests. Each of the metrics has its own strengths and
weaknesses and respond differently to various testing conditions. While [22] tested several
common distortion types, there are still far too many distortions that remain untested to justify the
use of only a single image quality metric.
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Chapter 3
IMAGE DISTORTIONS
This section will provide an analysis of commonly used types of image distortion. It will also
provide example images of the actual visual impact of each distortion using multiple levels of
distortion.

3.1 GEOMETRIC TRANSFORMATIONS
3.1.1 PROJECTIVE TRANSFORMATIONS
Projective transforms are transformations which represent a change in perspective or
viewpoint. These transformations maintain the properties of incidence and cross-ratio, but do not
maintain sizes or angles. In a projective transformation straight lines will remain straight.
For a general projective transformation, transformed coordinates of x and y are represented as u
and v, where:
=

(2.1)

=

(2.2)

=

(2.3)

and T is a 3x3 matrix.
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The following sections will show how modifying different values within T in different ways results
in specific types of transformations.

Affine Transformations
Affine transformations are a subset of projective transformations; they preserve both ratio
of distances along a line and the collinearity between points. In affine transformations the original
length and angles within the image will not be preserved, and therefore the shapes of objects will
be modified. Affine transformations generally consist of translation, scaling, shearing, rotation and
combinations of these methods.
In affine transformations:
=

x scale_factor
= y shearing_coef
x displacement

1

y shearing_coef
y scale_factor
y displacement

(2.4)

0
0
1

(2.5)

Translation
The process of translation involves moving all pixel values by a constant value without any
other form of modification. Translating an image effectively moves it from one location on the plane
to another. Fig. 6 shows an image containing varying levels of x/y displacement.
The transformation matrix used for the displacement of pixel values is as follows:

=

1
0
x displacement
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0
1
y displacement

0
0
1

(2.6)

X/Y Displacement=0

X/Y Displacement=-50

X/Y Displacement=50

X/Y Displacement=100 X/Y Displacement=150 X/Y Displacement=200

Fig. 6. Translation

Scale
Changing the scale of an image proportionally increases the size of the image along an axis
by a particular scale factor. Generally the scale of an image is modified proportionally along both
the x and y axes, but these values may be changed independently as well. Fig. 7 shows an image
scaled on the X axis and Fig. 8 shows an image scaled on the Y axis.
The transformation matrix used for the modification of scale is as follows:

=

x scale_factor
0
0
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0
y scale_factor
0

0
0
1

(2.7)

X Scale Factor=1
X Scale Factor=2

X Scale Factor=4

X Scale Factor=5

X Scale Factor=3

X Scale Factor=6

Fig. 7. Scaling X-axis

Y Scale Factor=1

Y Scale Factor=4

Y Scale Factor=2

Y Scale Factor=3

Y Scale Factor=5

Y Scale Factor=6

Fig. 8. Scaling Y-axis

Shear
The process of shearing involves holding all pixels on an arbitrary line are fixed, while other
points are shifted parallel to that line by a distance proportional to the perpendicular distance from
that fixed line [33]. Positive x coefficients cause the bottom of the image to move to the right, while
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negative x coefficients cause the top of the image to move to the right. Positive y coefficients cause
the right side of the image to move down, while negative y coefficients move the left side of the
image down. Fig. 9 shows the results of changing the X shearing coefficient and Fig. 10 shows the
results of changing the Y shearing coefficient.
X Shearing Coeff=0

X Shearing Coeff=1

X Shearing Coeff=-0.5

X Shearing Coeff=0.5

X Shearing Coeff=2

X Shearing Coeff=3

Fig. 9. Shearing X Coefficient

Y Shearing Coeff=0

Y Shearing Coeff=1

Y Shearing Coeff=-0.5

Y Shearing Coeff=0.5

Y Shearing Coeff=2

Y Shearing Coeff=3

Fig. 10. Shearing Y Coefficient
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The transformation matrix used for shearing is as follows:
1
= x shearing_coef
0

y shearing_coef
1
1

0
0
1

(1.1)

Rotation

The process of rotation involves rotating an object about its center pixel location.
The transformation matrix used for rotation is as follows:
cos(angle)
= sin(angle)
0

−sin(angle)
cos(angle)
0

0
0
1

(1.2)

The angle should be entered in the form of radians, where counterclockwise rotation correspond to
positive radian values and clockwise rotation correspond to negative radian values. Fig. 11 shows
an image rotation using six different settings.
Rotation Angle=0

Rotation Angle=45

Rotation Angle=90

Rotation Angle=135

Rotation Angle=180

Rotation Angle=225

Fig. 11. Rotation
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Resolution Reduction
Reducing the resolution of an image simply involves down-sampling the image by a
particular scale factor and then up-sampling back to the original resolution. In the example used
below, no interpolation is used when up-scaling the images; this method results in the greatest
amount of visual distortion. Fig. 12 shows an image under increasing levels of resolution reduction.

Scale Factor=1/1

Scale Factor=1/2

Scale Factor=1/4

Scale Factor=1/16

Scale Factor=1/32

Scale Factor=1/64

Fig. 12. Scale Factor Modification

3.1.2 PIECEWISE LINEAR TRANSFORMATIONS:
Piecewise linear transformations consist of applying different transformations to different
parts of the image. This is effectively performed by splitting the image into multiple sub-images,
performing modifications to each sub-image and then merging the sub-images together. Fig. 13 has
been modified by leaving the left half of the image untouched and horizontally scaling the right half
of the image by different scale factors.
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Magnification=1
Magnification=1.5
Magnification=3

Magnification=6

Magnification=8

Magnification=10

Fig. 13. Piecewise Linear Transformation

3.1.3 RADIAL TRANSFORMATION
Barrel Transformation:
In a barrel transformation, the magnification scaling factor of the image decreases in
relation to the distance from the center axis. The transformation is performed by changing the x,y
coordinates into polar coordinates and then scaling the r coordinates as follows:
=
where

is a scaling factor and larger values of

barrel distortion using six different values of

+( ∗

)

(1.3)

result in a larger distortion effect. Fig. 14 shows the

(amplitude). Fig. 14 shows an image under various levels

of barrel distortion.
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Amplitude=0

Amplitude=1e-005

Amplitude=2e-005

Amplitude=0.0001

Amplitude=0.0002

Amplitude=0.0004

Fig. 14. Barrel Image Effect

Pin-Cushion Transformation:
In a pin-cushion transformation, the magnification scaling factor of the image increases in
relation to the distance from the center axis. The transformation is performed by supplying
negative values for the barrel transformation equation. Fig. 15 shows an image under various levels
of pin-cushion distortion.
Amplitude=0

Amplitude=-6e-007

Amplitude=-9e-007

Amplitude=-2e-006

Amplitude=-3e-006

Amplitude=-3.5e-006

Fig. 15. Pin Cushion Effect
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3.1.4 POLYNOMIAL TRANSFORMATION
A polynomial transformation is a transformation involving the remapping of linear
coordinates. These transformations are generally used to make corrections in size or general
orientation. In cases where the image is in correct orientation, this method can also be used to
distort the image. Unlike the first-order projective transformations, the weighting coefficients in the
T matrix of second-order transformations have no physical counterparts, making the choosing of
coefficients more difficult [34]. A second-order polynomial distortion can be seen in Fig. 16.
A 2nd-order polynomial transformation where u and v represent the modified x and y coordinates
takes the following form:
= 1

(1.4)

where T is the following 6x2 matrix with weighting coefficients a0-a5 and b0-b5:

=

0
1
2
3
4
5

0
1
2
3
4
5

Fig. 16. 2nd-Order Polynomial Stretching
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(1.5)

3.2 NOISE GENERATION
Noise can be considered to be a addition of a degradation signal to the original image signal.
Noise generally takes on two forms, either periodic or random. MATLAB's built-in function, imnoise,
is used to generate both additive and multiplicative noise.

3.2.1 SALT & PEPPER NOISE
The most basic form of random noise is salt & pepper noise, which simply replaces random
pixels in the image with black and white pixels. MATLAB's implementation of salt and pepper noise
takes on a single parameter, which indicates the percentage of the picture that is affected by the
noise. An example of various levels of salt and pepper noise is shown in Fig. 17.

Percentage of Noise=0

Percentage of Noise=10

Percentage of Noise=20

Percentage of Noise=50

Percentage of Noise=70

Percentage of Noise=100

Fig. 17. Salt & Pepper Noise

3.2.2 GAUSSIAN NOISE
Gaussian noise is a form of additive white noise which is given a normal distribution. Both
the mean and variance of the noise can be modified to change the intensity of the noise. Fig. 18
shows an image modified by zero-mean Gaussian noise using different variance values.
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Variance=0

Variance=0.01

Variance=0.02

Variance=0.1

Variance=0.2

Variance=1

Fig. 18. Gaussian Noise - Zero Mean

3.2.3 SPECKLE NOISE
Speckle noise is a form of multiplicative noise. In multiplicative noise, the random noise
values are multiplied by the pixel values of the images rather than being added to the pixel values.
MATLAB's implementation produces a zero-mean, normally distributed speckle noise with a
variance parameter. Fig. 19 shows an image distorted by speckle noise using different variance
values.
Variance=0

Variance=0.01

Variance=0.02

Variance=0.2

Variance=1

Variance=4

Fig. 19. Speckle Noise
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3.2.4 PERIODIC NOISE
Unlike most forms of noise, which are based on a random pattern, periodic noise takes on a
predictable pattern. Periodic noise is a global effect to the image and cannot be removed by
modeling local degradations [35]. Fig. 20 replicates the appearance of scan-lines.

Thickness=0

Thickness=40

Thickness=20

Thickness=10

Thickness=5

Thickness=1

Fig. 20. Periodic Noise - Horizontal

Periodic noise can be produced by producing a noise (n) based on a periodic function (such as sin
or cos) and adding it to the original image.

3.3 MATHEMATICAL MORPHOLOGY
Mathematical Morphology is a technique for operating on an image using concepts oriented
around set theory. In a simple binary image, white pixels generally represent the foreground and
black pixels represent the background. In a grayscale image, pixels are mapped to a threedimensional space based on the intensity of each pixel values. In this case, a three-dimensional
structuring element is also used. The two basic transformations of mathematical morphing are
dilation and erosion.
34

3.3.1 DILATION
In order to perform a morphological operation the image and an array (often referred to as
the kernel) are both required. The kernel is a structuring element that determines how the dilation
operates. In order to perform the dilation operation, the kernel is placed over each background
pixel. If any of the pixels in the kernel overlap with a foreground pixel, then the selected
background pixel is turned into a foreground pixel. This effectively causes the pixels to grow and
expand into one another.
Flat Dilation is defined as:

⊕

=

(1.6)
∈

Non-Flat (gray-scale) Dilation is defined in [36] as:
⊕ ( , )=

( −

, −
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)|( ,

)∈

}

(1.7)

where Db is the domain of b.
Fig. 21 is an example of a non-flat dilation performed using a "sphere-shaped" structuring element
with a height of 5 and a varying radius.
Original

Radius=5

Radius=10

Radius=15

Radius=20

Radius=25

Fig. 21. Non-Flat Dilation - Sphere Shaped Structure
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3.3.2 EROSION
The erosion operation works in an opposite manner to that of the dilation. Instead of
causing pixels to expand into one another, erosion causes areas of pixels to shrink. To perform this
operation, the kernel is placed over each foreground pixel. If any of the pixels in the kernel overlap
with a background pixel, then the selected pixel is turned into a background pixel.
Flat Erosion is defined as:

⊖

=
∈

(1.8)

Non-Flat Dilation is defined in [36] as:
⊖ ( , )=

( +

, +

)−

( ,

)|( ,

)∈

}

(1.9)

where Db is the domain of b.
Fig. 22 is an example of a non-flat erosion performed using a "sphere-shaped" structuring element
with a height of 5 and a varying radius.

Original

Radius=5

Radius=10

Radius=15

Radius=20

Radius=25

Fig. 22. Non-Flat Erosion - Sphere Shaped Structure

36

3.3.3 OPENING
The opening operation consists of performing an erosion operation and then a dilation
operation, while using the same kernel for both operations. The effect of these two operations is
that sharp edges are removed from the image.
Flat and non-flat opening is defined as:
○

=( ⊖ )⊕

(1.10)

Fig. 23 is an example of a non-flat opening performed using a "sphere-shaped" structuring element
with a height of 5 and a varying radius.
Original

Radius=5

Radius=10

Radius=15

Radius=20

Radius=25

Fig. 23. Non-Flat Opening - Sphere Shaped Structure

3.3.4 CLOSING
The closing operation is the opposite of an opening operation and consists of performing a
dilation operation and then an erosion operation, while using the same kernel for both operations.
The effect of the two operations is that small holes and gaps in the image are filled.
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Flat and non-flat closing is defined as:
•

=( ⊕ )⊖

(1.11)

Fig. 24 is an example of a non-flat closing performed using a "sphere-shaped" structuring element
with a height of 5 and a varying radius.

Original

Radius=5

Radius=10

Radius=15

Radius=20

Radius=25

Fig. 24. Non-Flat Closing - Sphere Shaped Structure

3.4 FREQUENCY-BASED MODIFICATIONS
Performing certain operations in the frequency domain can be much less computationally
intensive than in the spatial domain. For example, performing basic filtering operations is much
simpler in the frequency than it is in the spatial domain. In order to perform filtering in the
frequency domain, the FFT is first performed on the image, the filter is then multiplied by the
transformed image and then the inverse FFT is performed.

3.4.1 LOW-PASS FILTERING
The blurring operation is performed through the use of a low-pass filter. The Gaussian blur
works by assigning each pixel a weighted average value based on the pixel in that pixel’s
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neighborhood. The selected pixel’s value receives the greatest weighting constant and nearby pixels
receive increasing smaller weights in proportion to their distance from the selected pixel.
The 2D Gaussian blur is defined as:

( , )=

1

(1.12)

2

where x is the horizontal distance from the origin, y is the vertical distance from the origin and σ is
the standard deviation.
We apply a rotationally symmetric Gaussian low-pass filter of a set size over the image with
varying degrees of standard deviation. When keeping the filter size fixed, increasing the standard
deviation increases the blur of the image. Fig. 25 uses a fixed 20x20 window size.

STD Dev=0.1

STD Dev=3

STD Dev=5

STD Dev=10

STD Dev=50

STD Dev=100

Fig. 25. Gaussian Blur

3.4.2 HIGH-PASS FILTERING
Unlike low-pass filters, which blur the image, high-pass filters do the opposite and act to
sharpen the image. For example, the Laplacian filter is a 2nd derivative high-pass filter which
highlights regions of rapid intensity change. This type of filter also works well in edge detection, but
due to its high sensitivity to minor amounts of noise, the image must often be smoothed or blurred
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before detection is performed. Changing α changes the shape of the Laplacian filter. Several
examples of the Laplacian filter are shown in Fig. 26.
The Laplacian filter can be written as follows:
α
1−α
4
4
4
1−α
∇ =
−1
(α + 1) 4
α
1−α
4
4

α
4
1−α
4
α
4

(1.13)

Fig. 26. Laplacian Filtering

3.5 CONTRAST ADJUSTMENT
3.5.1 CONTRAST STRETCHING
Contrast stretching involves modifying the contrast in an image by modifying the range of
intensity values it contains. When darkening an image, the upper part of the histogram is mapped
over the entire range of the output histogram. In the case of lightening an image, the lower portion
of the histogram, representing the lighter portions of the image, are mapped over the entire range
of the output histogram. To darken an image, the upper portion of the histogram is selected and
remapped over the entire histogram range. To lighten an image, the lower portion of the histogram
is selected and remapped over the entire histogram range. The smaller the range of the selected
original histogram, the greater the difference in contrast. Fig. 27 shows contrast stretching which
results in a darker image and Fig. 28 shows contrast stretching which results in a lighter image.
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Range=[0-1]

Range=[0.1-1]

Range=[0.25-1]

Range=[0.5-1]

Range=[0.75-1]

Range=[0.8-1]

Fig. 27. Contrast Stretching - [0.5 1] -> [0 1]

Range=[0-1]

Range=[0-0.9]

Range=[0-0.7]

Range=[0-0.5]

Range=[0-0.3]

Range=[0-0.2]

Fig. 28. Contrast Stretching - [0 0.5] -> [0 1]

3.6 OTHER TRANSFORMATIONS
3.6.1 OIL-PAINT TRANSFORMATION
The oil-painting transformation involves calculating the histogram for each pixel and its
surrounding pixels and then assigning the most commonly occurring brightness value to that pixel
[37]. Increasing the window size when determining brightness values results in larger "oil-droplet"
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sizes, giving the image a more distorted appearance. An example of the oil-painting transformation
is shown in Fig. 29.

Fig. 29. Oil Painting Effect
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Chapter 4
CAPTCHA SYSTEM DESIGN
4.1 GENERATION OF BACKGROUND
The first stage in building the CAPTCHA image is to generate a suitable background on
which to place the face and non-face images. The background that was chosen was a random
background of 75 to 125 pixel rectangles. This background was chosen in order to help deter
computerized CAPTCHA detection. Each rectangle's color is a random grayscale value. The concept
behind the random background is that the randomized rectangles help mask the location of the
placed face and non-face images by preventing techniques such as edge detection. Additionally,
further noise and/or patterns could be added to each rectangle in order to further enhance security.
The generated background images are 500x300 pixels in size. An example of one of the sample
background images is shown in Fig. 30.

Fig. 30. CAPTCHA Background Image
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4.2 IMAGE COLLECTIO
O
ON
4.2.1 OBTAINING THE UNMO
ODIFIED FAC
CE IMAGES
The images chosen forr the face images are from the Carnegie Melon
M
Univeersity
mages face database
d
[38]. The datab
base consistss of 180 gray
yscale face images of vaarying
frontal_im
sizes and
d rotations. From this dattaset, images were chosen
n to be used in the CAPT
TCHAs. In add
dition
to the CM
MU images, the
t image 'Leena' was also
o added to the
t test database for a to
otal of 80 im
mages.
The imagges that weree removed frrom the origginal datasett included mu
ultiple faces,, contained a face
that was too small or had a low reesolution. Th
he final 80 im
mages were converted
c
to a PNG format for
consisten
ncy. An exam
mple of an imaage from the CMU face daatabase is shown in Fig. 31.
3

Fig. 31. Face Im
mage from CMU Database

4.2.2 OBTAINING THE UNMO
ODIFIED NO
ON-FACE IMA
AGES
The non-face image datab
base was gen
nerated by downloading
d
a set of rand
dom images from
the website Flickr. Fliickr is a web
bsite where users
u
may up
pload, view and
a organizee their images and
videos. The advantagge of using Fllickr to geneerate random
m test imagess is that the website provides
an excelllent search API
A for findiing and dow
wnloading th
he images an
nd because users
u
are ab
ble to
indicate whether
w
or not they wissh to distribute their wo
ork under th
he Creative Commons
C
liccense.
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pecific Creattive Common's licenses,, users are allowed to redistribute the works with
Under sp
modificattions, which was requireed as each no
on-face imagge was to be distorted beefore being added
a
to it's reespective CA
APTCHA image [39]. Th
he images were
w
random
mly generatted using seearch
keywordss of animal species such as
a 'dog', 'frogg' or 'horse'. From the ran
ndom images downloadeed, 65
were cho
osen to be ussed for the CA
APTCHA dattabase. Once selected, theese images were
w
convertted to
grayscalee PNG files to
o allow for co
onsistency with
w the face database.
d
An
n example of one of the im
mages
from Flickr, which waas used in thee test databaase is shown in Fig. 32.

Fig. 32. Non--Face Image from
m Flickr

4.3 IMAGE DISTORTIO
I
ON
4.3.1 SELECTION OF DISTOR
RTIONS
During th
he process of
o selecting distortions, 24 distortio
ons were tessted and com
mpared. Of these
distortion
ns, 16 weree used in th
he generation of the CA
APTCHA imaages. Table 1 lists all of
o the
distortion
ns used duriing CAPTCHA generation
n. Table 2 liists the disto
ortions that were tested
d, but
eventuallly omitted due
d to similaarities to otther distortions or not having enou
ugh effect on
n the
images.
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Table 1. Distortions Used in CAPTCHAs

1.
3.
5.
7.
9.
11.
13.
15.

Distortions used in CAPTCHAs
Barrel
2. Opening
Blur
4. Periodic Noise
Closing
6. Piecewise Scaling
Darkening
8. Resolution Modification
Dilation
10. Rotation
Erosion
12. Scaling x-coordinates
Laplacian Filtering 14. Scaling y-coordinates
Lightening
16. Speckle Noise

Table 2. Omitted Distortions

Omitted Distortions
Translation
X/Y Proportionate
Scaling
Shearing
Pin Cushion
Polynomial
Salt & Pepper Noise
Gaussian Noise
Oil Paint Distortion

Reason for Omission
Did not yield any desirable effect
Effect already performed when adding image to CAPTCHAs
Until undesirable levels of shearing are reached the results are very similar to
rotation
Did not provide enough distortion to center of image
Too many parameters to achieve quantifiable different amounts of distortion
Not sufficiently different than speckle noise
Not sufficiently different than speckle noise
Similar to morphologic operation results

4.3.2 DISTORTING THE FACE AND NON-FACE IMAGES
Before merging the database images with the randomly generated background images, each image
from the database was modified using each of 16 different types of image distortion. The distortions
used were: barrel, blur, closing, darken, dilation, erosion, Laplacian filtering, lightening, opening,
periodic noise, piecewise scaling, resolution modification, rotation, scaling the x coordinates,
scaling the y coordinates, and speckle noise. For the chosen distortions, three levels of severity for
each distortion were chosen. These levels of severity are labeled as 1, 2 and 3 in the database, with
1 being a small level of distortion, 2 being a medium level of distortion and 3 being a severe level of
distortion. The settings for each level were initially chosen randomly, and then adjusted as
determined necessary.
Fig. 33 and Fig. 34 show distorted face and non-face images with level 2 speckle distortion. Table 3
shows the distortions and parameters used during distortion.
Table 3. Parameters of Distortions

Distortion
Barrel Distortion
Blur
Closing

Variable Adjusted
Amplitude of Cubic Term
Std Dev
Radius
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1
0.00008
4
3

2
0.0002
8
5

3
.0005
20
8

Darkeningg
Dilation
Erosion
Laplacian Filtering
Lighteningg
Opening
Periodic Noise
N
Piecewisee Scaling
Resolution Resizing
Rotation
Scaling X
Scaling Y
Speckle Noise
N

Histogrram Min-rangge
Radius
Radius
Α
Histogrram Max-rangge
Radius
% of im
mage removed
d
Scale Factor
F
Scale Factor
F
Degreees Rotated
Scale Factor
F
Scale Factor
F
Variancce

0.5
0
3
3
2
20
0
0.6
3
2
2/3
2
2:1
1
1:4
4
45
4
2
2.5
0
0.2
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0.6
0
5
5
10
0
0.5
5
4
4/5
3:1
1:8
90
5
3
1

0.7
8
8
5
0.3
8
6/7
6:1
1:10
180
6
4
3

Fig
g. 33. Face image
e Modified with Speckle
S
Noise

Fig. 34.
3 Non-Face Ima
age Modified witth Speckle Noise
e

4.4 LOCATING
G FACES
Once the original and
d modified face databasess were generrated, a new database waas created to store
the boun
nding coordin
nates of the face imagess. These coo
ordinates weere determin
ned manually
y and
represented the areaa within the face image that contain
ned the actu
ual face. The coordinatess that
ved were the upper-left x and y valuees and the lo
ower-right x and y values. In the finaalized
were sav
CAPTCHA
A, the user is
i required to
t click with
hin these coo
ordinates in order to co
orrectly solv
ve the
CATPCHA
A. Clicking on
o the imagee itself, but outside of these
t
coordinates repressents a failu
ure to
successfu
ully solve thee CAPTCHA. The
T first step
p in the geneeration of thee database in
nvolved obtaaining
the coord
dinates for th
he original faace images. Once
O
these co
oordinates were
w
determined, the mod
dified
face coorrdinate dataabase was generated
g
by directly copying
c
the original coordinates fo
or all
modificattions that did
d not involvee the modificcation of the pixel locatio
ons. In the caases of the barrel,
were
rotation, piecewise scaling, and x and y scalling modificaations, the lo
ocated face coordinates
c
med
transform

acccordingly

to

match
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the

appropriatee

distortion.

Fig. 35 shows an example image from the test database with a bounding box drawn to represent the
location of the actual face on the face image.

Fig. 35. Example Image With Bounding Coordinates Drawn Around Face

4.5 GENERATING CAPTCHAS
After the distorted face and non-face image databases were generated, these images were used to
generate the final CAPTCHA images. The CAPTCHA images were created by taking the background
images and overlaying several distorted images. Before being placed on top of the background, the
face and non-face images were resized so that neither the length nor the width exceeded a
randomly generated value between 75 and 125 pixels. A total of four to five total images were
placed on each background image. Of these four to five images, one to the total number of images
minus 1 were face images, with the remaining being non-face images. Two base CAPTCHAs for each
combination of face/non-face images was generated resulting in a total of 14 base CAPTCHA images
during testing. From these 14 base CAPTCHAs, one variance for each of the 16 distortions and 3
levels of distortion was generated resulting in 672 distorted CAPTCHAs.
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An example of a completed CAPTCHA image can be found in Fig. 36. Along with the
generated

CAPTCHAs,

a

log

was

generated

which

contained

the

data

shown

in

Table 4. The table contains data regarding which images were stored in a particular CAPTCHA and
the relative face coordinates of each placed face image. This log was used to generate a MySQL
database, which was used in determining whether or not the user clicked in the correct location(s)
within the CAPTCHA image.

Fig. 36. Example Completed CAPTCHA Image

Table 4. Generated CAPTCHA Log
File
Name

Distortion
Type

Distortion
Level

Height

Width

Total
Images

Face
Images

Faces
Embedded

Non-faces
Embedded

Face
Coordinates

Placed
Image
Coords

Face
Size

Nonface
Size

4.6 SERVER & DATABASE
Two primary databases are used for determining success and statistics regarding success rates for
the implemented CAPTCHAs. The generated CAPTCHA database, which was created from the
previously mentioned log file, contains information regarding which images are located in which
CAPTCHAs, the level of distortion for the particular CAPTCHA, the size of the CAPTCHA image and
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the locations of the face coordinates. The fields from this database are shown in Table 5. When a
CAPTCHA attempt is submitted on the website, the clicked face coordinates are verified against the
actual face coordinates stored in the generated CAPTCHA database. If the clicked coordinates fall
within those coordinates stored in the face coordinates field, then the CAPTCHA is considered to be
successfully solved.
The second database, the CAPTCHA log, is used primarily in determining statistics for the
CAPTCHAs including storing success rates, user attempts, time taken to solve and clicked
coordinates. Whenever a CAPTCHA is attempted, information regarding that attempt is written to
the database, which is shown in Table 6. This database stored all CAPTCHA results solved by
humans and was the basis for all of statistical analysis of the human-based success rates and time
taken to solve.
Table 5. Generated CAPTCHA Database Fields

id

file

distortion
type

distortion
amount

count
total
images

count
face
images

image
height

image
width

face
coords

original
face
images

original
other
images

Table 6. CAPTCHA Log Database Fields

id

captchaid

attempt

success

ip

username

generatedtime

firstclicktime

submittime

coords

4.7 USER INTERFACE
Due to the large number of generated CAPTCHA images, in order to determine reliable statistics
regarding the success rates of the CAPTCHAs, each CAPTCHA image needed to be tested by a large
number of users and needed to be tested multiple times. In order to achieve this, the CAPTCHA was
implemented on the WVU Computer Science 101 website, which is used by hundreds of students on
a daily basis for the purpose of recording attendance. In order to record attendance, the students
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must login to the website using their WVU MasterID username and password. The CAPTCHA was
added to this login page and was set up so that students were required to solve the CAPTCHA each
time they wished to record their attendance. In order to successfully solve the CAPTCHA, the user
must click on each of the faces located within the CAPTCHA image. In the event that the CAPTCHA is
solved incorrectly, an error message is displayed and the user is required to once again fill out the
login information as well as solve a different CAPTCHA image. A screen capture of the CS101
attendance page, along with the implemented CAPTCHA is shown in Fig. 37.
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Fig. 37. Screen-Capture of CAPTCHA Implemented on CS101 Website
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Chapter 5
RESULTS
5.1 IMAGE QUALITY METRICS
In order to determine the severity of the distortions applied to the images from an
analytical perspective, nine image quality metrics were used to determine the variance in quality
between each of the undistorted CAPTCHAs and the distorted variants of those CAPTCHAs.
For the 16 distortion types, each distorted image of a particular type was compared with its
corresponding original image. The 3 levels of distortion for each distortion type, 14 base CAPTCHA
images, and 16 tested distortions, resulted in 672 comparisons for each of the 10 metrics. The tests
were performed using MATLAB along with the the Metrix MuX package [40], which is a collection of
image quality metric algorithms combined under a common interface along with run_metrics.m,
which is wrapper code to perform all of the Metrix Mux operations. The results of each test are
categorized by distortion type, degree of distortion and metric and are shown in Table 7. The
numbers in the table represent an average of 14 tests run for each level of distortion and distortion
type.
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Table 7. Metrics for Distortions

Distortion
barrel
barrel
barrel

Level
1
2
3

IFC
NQM
12.74666 4.421135
12.74606 4.57092
12.73014 4.565882

PSNR
14.63399
14.73617
14.71801

MSE
2372.972
2319.893
2326.855

SNR
SSIM
UQI
9.563371 0.762702 0.729507
9.665551 0.764661 0.73215
9.647391 0.76025 0.727125

VIF
0.332562
0.332376
0.328839

VIFP
0.449834
0.449153
0.446473

VSNR
7.954591
8.044797
7.973947

blur
blur
blur

1
2
3

14.90893 28.78776
30.987 61.30213 25.91638 0.960041 0.951726 0.683272 0.735641 29.67261
14.40342 25.54581 28.63166 102.7533 23.56104 0.935562 0.926543 0.607477 0.688435 25.8292
14.23992 24.42416 27.87122 121.7605 22.8006 0.925375 0.916256 0.581041 0.672903 24.66467

closing
closing
closing

1
2
3

15.66718 22.31213 29.85903 85.34334 24.78841
0.9741 0.966577 0.736364 0.802425 24.13617
15.20528 19.8976 27.61969 136.6949 22.54907 0.961271 0.951544 0.677841 0.763948 21.03724
14.85883 17.7647 25.63734 208.5782 20.56672 0.945173 0.933281 0.623006 0.725889 18.38579

darken
darken
darken

1
2
3

14.23332 9.164081 18.12963 1069.715 13.05901 0.845899 0.847259 0.573693 0.67275 16.37755
13.9576 7.786826 16.75153 1458.283 11.68091 0.822612 0.823918 0.525816 0.63419 15.62855
13.72664 6.497948 15.47522 1933.233 10.4046 0.800266 0.80161 0.483804 0.599632 15.17146

dilation
dilation
dilation

1
2
3

14.30347 15.42151 23.20019 353.4115 18.12957 0.927341 0.917725 0.572924 0.675087 15.88895
13.97663 13.24104 21.26045 540.7473 16.18983 0.900716 0.889824 0.517878 0.635663 13.49241
13.72832 11.3808 19.6887 764.6583 14.61808 0.875071 0.862181 0.474869 0.605232 11.65753

erosion
erosion
erosion

1
2
3

14.38 15.97381 23.38371 338.202 18.31309 0.930347 0.918211 0.579915 0.680666 22.29343
14.03676 13.58629 21.1752 554.1346 16.10458 0.899488 0.886212 0.523686 0.639361 20.27136
13.78842 11.62822 19.50565 806.0411 14.43503 0.871304 0.856706 0.48091 0.608597 18.78116

laplacian
laplacian
laplacian

1
2
3

13.09356 2.866438 12.05816 4420.367 6.987536 0.732072 0.729765 0.37396 0.506137 14.76553
13.07089 3.357798 12.55426 4008.336 7.48364 0.732053 0.725416 0.372589 0.505481 14.81895
13.02613 4.06011 13.29507 3457.31 8.224452 0.726631 0.715579 0.368457 0.50119 14.44657

lighten
lighten
lighten

1
2
3

14.83242 12.18835 20.03647 675.5618 14.96585 0.931098 0.908805 0.659593 0.735759 11.64302
14.41462 10.05768 18.28019 1012.554 13.20957 0.90735 0.882312 0.599512 0.686351 9.411796
13.79511 6.378439 15.24904 2028.818 10.17842 0.855577 0.826124 0.498266 0.601017 6.345327

opening
opening
opening

1
2
3

15.75677 22.94271 30.80787 68.88375 25.73725 0.976099 0.964062 0.750299 0.817193 29.64863
15.26959 20.41094 28.23205 119.8743 23.16143 0.963106 0.948828 0.69107 0.778301 26.76061
14.84279 18.13706 25.97536 200.5996 20.90474 0.946942 0.930361 0.634181 0.738099 24.35814

periodic
periodic

1
2

14.53007 7.126341 14.91652 2251.388 9.845903 0.816076 0.801747 0.557411 0.61312 15.28423
13.98096 4.955597 13.32222 3255.221 8.251596 0.768245 0.758513 0.482031 0.559188 14.86991
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periodic

3

13.78058 4.117636 12.71862 3740.456 7.648001

piecewise
piecewise
piecewise

1
2
3

12.71513 5.317149 15.73597 1846.75 10.66535 0.771795 0.739838 0.377081 0.503221 9.44514
12.39884 4.226259 14.70946 2332.315 9.638839 0.750003 0.716722 0.338654 0.468826 8.375987
12.46997 3.794287 14.11109 2683.203 9.040472 0.74896 0.716046 0.330219 0.456914 7.871656

resolution
resolution
resolution

1
2
3

16.75761 32.05313 34.35378 37.83564 29.28316 0.983952 0.980145 0.831798 0.83714 36.40972
15.29323 26.45745 29.38656 94.5395 24.31594 0.954572 0.948757 0.68804 0.739939 27.69022
15.06325 26.38778 28.68442 107.9059 23.6138 0.943893 0.937607 0.663079 0.721109 26.31165

rotate
rotate
rotate

1
2
3

12.07874 3.78331 14.38876 2496.746 9.318139 0.727952 0.693271 0.311114 0.427348 7.724963
11.8164 3.277151 13.94964 2760.486 8.879017 0.721544 0.685528 0.319231 0.440838 7.458746
13.02173
4.3657 14.98736 2157.746 9.916736 0.772125 0.748791 0.367393 0.506312 8.390551

scale_x
scale_x
scale_x

1
2
3

12.55147 3.855579 14.14066 2667.542 9.07004 0.752726 0.719422 0.334101 0.459668 7.909268
12.55746 3.804976 14.03971 2729.707 8.969092 0.752513 0.718697 0.331255 0.456254 7.797343
12.56008 3.80353 14.00219 2756.203 8.931569 0.75313 0.718837 0.329736 0.454049 7.752814

scale_y
scale_y
scale_y

1
2
3

12.51568 4.150942 14.57695 2409.597 9.506328 0.753984 0.721899 0.341221 0.469421 7.931818
12.50991 4.104293 14.44561 2485.128 9.374991 0.754101 0.72218 0.337965 0.465719 7.820834
12.51819 4.073539 14.29416 2578.313 9.223545 0.75388 0.721674 0.333652 0.461185 7.704628

speckle
speckle
speckle

1
2
3

15.10733 24.03985 28.8201 105.8226 23.74948 0.941226 0.937499 0.701264 0.739581 28.99561
14.18007 17.20641 22.79204 408.7769 17.72142 0.887974 0.886511 0.567123 0.639346 22.11757
13.76343 14.58099 21.02494 598.7517 15.95432 0.857178 0.85516 0.504789 0.59367 19.55071
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0.75081 0.745004 0.452622 0.535669 14.73752

Once all the distortion data was compiled, the metrics were placed into one of the following
categories of image quality metrics: statistical, high-level HVS and low-level HVS. The statistical
methods include the MSE, SNR, PSNR. The low-level HVS methods include the NQM and VSNR. The
high-level HVS methods include the IFC, UQI, SSIM, VIF and VIFP. Once the metrics were sorted, the
correlation between each of the metrics within each category was taken in order to determine
similarity between metrics and reduce the amount of overall data to be examined. The correlations
are shown in Table 8, Table 9 and Table 10.
Table 8. Correlation of Statistical Metrics

MSE

SNR
PSNR
0.919315 0.919315
0.919315
1
0.919315 1

MSE
SNR
PSNR

Table 9. Correlation of Low-Level HVS Metrics

NQM
NQM
VSNR

VSNR
0.920046

0.920046

Table 10. Correlation of High-level HVS Metrics

IFC
IFC
SSIM
UQI
VIF
VIFP

0.921187
0.941969
0.988929
0.977565

SSIM
UQI
0.921187 0.941969
0.994294
0.994294
0.949712 0.965707
0.960603 0.97526

VIF
VIFP
0.988929 0.977565
0.949712 0.960603
0.965707 0.97526
0.991932
0.991932

For the statistically based metrics, the MSE, SNR and PSNR showed a very strong correlation
and also showed identical data for the ranking of severity of each distortion which reduces the
necessity to present further data for all three metrics. Of the statistical based methods, the PSNR
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was selected for further analysis. For the low-level HVS based methods, the NQM and showed a
strong correlation, but upon further analysis of the data, there were many differences in the
ordering of severity of different distortion types. Because of these differences and the knowledge
that the NQM and VSNR are based on quite different methodologies, both the NQM and VSNR were
chosen for further analysis. There were a number of strong correlations found within the high-level
HVS metrics. Of the VIF, VIFP and IFC, only the VIF was chosen for further analysis due to the VIFP
being simply a computationally simpler multi-scale version of VIF and the IFC being the basis of the
work for the improved VIF. The strong correlation between the SSIM and UQI is due to the SSIM
being a general form of the UQI and because of this, only the SSIM was chosen for further analysis.

5.1.1 STATISTICAL METRIC ANALYSIS
The PSNR showed results that were as expected for a statistical based analysis. These
results are shown in Fig. 38. Distortion methods which did not involve the moving of pixel locations
such as resolution reduction and blurring yielded the greatest PSNR, while those that involved
moving pixel locations such as the barrel distortion, rotation and scaling yielded some of the lowest
PSNRs. Although the periodic function does not involve the moving of pixels, it also yielded a very
low PSNR; this is most likely due to the large amount of data removed during the distortion. The
Laplacian filtering performed the worst due to the operation removing much of the image data and
only leaving the image’s edges.
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Fig. 38. PSNR Metrics

5.1.2 LOW-LEVEL HVS METRIC ANALYSIS
The low-level HVS metrics yielded similar results to the PSNR, especially in the case of the
NQM. The NQM ranked the traditional distortions among the highest and ranked the pixel-location
based distortions among the worst. Its results are quite similar to the PSNR's results due to the
NQM metric's reliance on a weighted signal-to-noise ratio. The results for the NQM are shown in
Fig. 39. The VSNR's dependence on geometric pixel locations is shown to be even greater than that
of the PSNR and NQM. The 5 distortions that involved modifying pixel locations ranked the worst
on the VSNR scale. The results for the VSNR are shown in Fig. 40.
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5.1.3 HIGH-LEVEL HVS ANALYSIS
The SSIM metric yielded very strong results across all distortion types, with geometric
distortions yielding a low correlation between original and modified CAPTCHAs. Like the NQM and
PSNR, the Laplacian filtering yielded the lowest overall correlation. In general, the results
correspond with the data from [27], which shows the SSIM yielding better results for intensity
distortions than for spatial shifting. The most interesting point to note about the SSIM data is that
on a 0 to 1.0 scale, the lowest similarity index was 0.7303, which still indicates a strong similarity
between original and modified images. The SSIM appears to take the unchanged background data
into account more than the other metrics The results for the SSIM are shown in Fig. 41.
The VIF, which has a strong reliance on blur and additive noise yielded similar results to the other
metrics with the spatial distortions all yielding values in the 0.40 to 0.50 range. The highest ranking
of the results was the resolution distortion, which still only yielded a VIF of 0.7276 on a 0 to 1.0
scale. The results for the VIF are shown in Fig. 42.
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5.1.4 CONCLUSION OF METRIC ANALYSIS
Overall, the metrics showed that geometric distortions yield the least detectable similarity
between original and modified images. This is due to the metrics generally being spatially
dependent algorithms. The Laplacian filtering also ranked amongst the worst across all metrics due
to the amount of data lost during the filtering. The intensity, noise, erosion and dilation
modifications yielded quite variable results across the tests, but all ranked among the middle of the
results. Distortions which did little to modify intensity values or pixel locations, such as the
resolution reduction, blurring, the opening operation and the closing operation yield the greatest
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detectable similarity across all tests. Overall, the SSIM showed the best performance by yielding
high similarity rankings across all tests.

5.2 HUMAN RESULTS
The human results consist of 7897 attempts from students using the WVU CS101
attendance website. The users of the attendance website are undergraduate students from all
majors. The overall success rate of the experiment was 71.71% across all distortion types and
distortion levels. The data regarding success rates was also broken down into more specific
categories in order to show the correlation between distortion type and distortion amount.
The data that was gathered shows that, while increasing the distortion to the images does
decrease the success rate, that a light to medium level of distortion can be applied without a
significant reduction. Increasing the distortion from level 0 (no distortion) to level 1 decreased the
overall success rate by only 2.88%. The overall success rate of the level 3 distortion at 65.46%
shows that this level of distortion is too high for general use. The combined computer/human
success rates section will further discuss the best level of distortion for yielding the best human
results and the worst computer results. Error! Reference source not found.Table 11 shows the
success rate based on the amount of distortion applied.
Table 11. Human Success Rate by Distortion Amount

Distortion Amount
0
1
2
3

Success Rate
80.00%
77.12%
71.96%
65.46%

The next step in analyzing the data was to determine which distortion types had the least
effect on the success rates. The results showed that a number of the distortions had little effect on
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the success rate. The most successful of the distortion types was the resolution reduction; six other
distortions also had a very high success rate and showed only a 3% reduction in success rate from
the unmodified images. There was very little correlation found between categories of distortions
and the success rate. For example, the three modifications that involved scale distortion, which
were piecewise, scale_x, and scale_y, had vastly different success rates, with the scale_y operation
performing quite well, the piecewise operation showing an average success and the scale_x
performing the worst among all distortions. Table 12 shows the success rates based on distortion
type.
Table 12. Human Success Rates by Distortion Type

Distortion Type
original
resolution
blur
scale_y
lighten
rotate
opening
periodic
closing
piecewise
dilation
darken
speckle
erosion
barrel
laplacian
scale_x

Success Rate
80.00%
79.10%
78.37%
78.26%
78.11%
77.32%
77.25%
73.06%
73.00%
68.94%
68.79%
67.92%
66.87%
65.29%
65.19%
63.35%
61.52%

Some of the most important data for further research involves the analysis of the results
based on both distortion type and amount. The gathered data allows us to determine which
distortions should be applied more or less heavily in future testing. These complete results are
shown in Fig. 43. The lack of results for rotation distortion level 1 is due to an error in coordinate
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calculation. The remaining levels of distortion gave results that were the opposite of their assigned
degree of distortion. This is likely due to our subjective assignment of distortion levels. Similarly,
our ordering of the degree of distortion on the Laplacian filtering operation also shows opposite of
the actual results. With the Laplacian filtering, as our distortion level increases, the amount of edges
shown increases. It was assumed that with the higher number of edges that too much detail would
be shown and that the face would be difficult to detect, although the results show the opposite
effect. Another interesting result is that some operations actually increased the overall success
rate. This result occurred on the following level 1 distortions: blur, closing, lighten, opening,
piecewise and scale_y. It also occurred on the level 2 resolution and scale_y operations. While some
of these results may be due to slight inaccuracies with a limited dataset, it is also possible that in
some cases that the distortions actually made the face more easily detectable. For instance, the
lightening operation based on histogram adjustment places greater emphasis on the highlights of
the image and very well could make the face stand out more than in the original image.
The distortions that will most likely be used in further testing are those that achieved the
highest success rates under high levels of distortion. These include the blur, lightening, opening,
resolution and scale_y operations. These objectively ranked distortions all showed a reduction in
success rate of less than 10% from the unmodified images.
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5.3 COMPUTER RESULTS
One thing that is for certain is that CAPTCHAs will be subjected to automated attacks. In this
section we will analyze simple attacks involving random guessing as well as advanced attacks
involving the use of face detection algorithms.
One simple attack that could be performed against clickable CAPTCHAs is the random
guessing of image locations. In the worst case scenario where an attacker is actually able to
determine all of the image locations, but not determine if a human face exists, the attacker must still
guess the number of faces involved in each CAPTCHA. The following equation can be used to
determine the probability of guessing the correct number of faces:

4

:

4
4
4
+
+
3
2
1
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= 11.11%

(5.1)

5

:

5
5
5
5
+
+
+
4
3
2
1

= 3.33%

(5.2)

These percentages can also be reduced much further based on the fact that even if the correct faces
are chosen that the location of the face within the face image must then be selected.
In the case of an attacker who is using completely random clicking without the ability to
determine the location of any of the face and non-face images, the attacker must first guess the
number of times to click (1 through 4) and then must randomly choose locations. Each of the
generated CAPTCHAs is a 500x300 size image, which results in 150,000 possible click locations.
The placed face images are sized from 75 to 125 pixels on their longest side, which results in an
approximate average size of 100x100 pixels.

Given these approximations, the probability of

clicking on the correct image(s) is given as follows:

(100)(100)
= 0.05%
(500)(300)

(5.3)

Again, the above formula only gives the probability of locating the correct images and does not
factor in finding the location of the face within the actual face image. The given approximations do
indicate the difficulty of executing an attack based on the concept of randomly guessing the
locations of the face images.
In an attempt to prevent more complicated attacks, the face detection CATPCHA was also
tested against a popular face detection algorithm using various sets of training data. The algorithm
that was used is the Viola-Jones algorithm for Robust Real-time Object Detection [41]. Three
training data sets were used along with the algorithm to determine the overall accuracy of the face
detection.

The

training

data

sets

used

are

haarcascade_frontalface_alt2.xml,

haarcascade_frontalface_alt.xml and haarcascade_frontalface_default.xml, which are provided in
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[42]. In order to determine if the algorithm successfully solved a CAPTCHA, the following criteria
must be met: the coordinates for the face determined by the algorithm must lie completely within
the stored actual face coordinates assigned to a particular CAPTCHA, all faces in a CAPTCHA must
be found, and the algorithm should not provide any false detections.
After running the algorithms on all 686 images, the three training data sets were compared
against one another to determine if the different data sets provided similar results in overall
accuracy. It was also determined that the three training data sets did not provide the same results,
but instead had a variety of detection rates for particular images and distortion types. The overall
success rates based on the training data set used are shown in Table 13.
Table 13. Success Rate By Training Data

Training Data
Alt
Alt2
Default

Success Rate
11.66%
10.50%
11.22%

The next step in the analysis of the training data involved determining if there was a
connection between the amount of distortion applied to an image and the overall success rate. The
data showed that with an increase in overall distortion comes an inverse relationship to the overall
success rate of the computer detection algorithm. This proves that there is a tangible benefit to
increasing the distortion, although the distortion must be kept within the limits of high human
success rates. The success rates based on distortion type are shown in Table 14.
Table 14. Success Rate By Distortion Amount

Distortion Amount
0
1
2
3
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Success Rate
16.67%
13.39%
11.01%
8.63%

Data regarding the success rate based on the type of distortion was gathered in order to
determine which of the distortion types is the most useful in stopping computer based attacks. The
results show that the computer-based detection does not work well in methods involving scaling,
rotation and Laplacian filtering. An interesting conclusion regarding the data is that certain types of
distortion seemed to have a decrease in success rate with increased levels of distortion while others
were relatively unaffected. For instance, the barrel distortion shows a decrease in success rate of
9.53% when going from distortion level 1 to 2 and another 4.75% decrease when moving from
distortion level 2 to 3. The opening distortion on the other hand had the exact same success rate
from distortion level 1 to 2 and even increased slightly going from level 2 to 3. Another interesting
point to note is that some of the distortions actually had a positive effect on the overall success rate.
In most of these cases the improvements were found using level 1 and level 2 distortions. This
improvement is likely in part due to the distortions adjusting the contrast and clarity levels of the
picture to better match those used in training set. Overall this data provides valuable information
regarding which distortion types and levels are necessary in order to prevent computer-based face
detection. Fig. 44 shows the average success rate for all CAPTCHAs based on the distortion type
used and level of distortion.
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Fig. 44. Success Rate by Distortion and Level

In addition to the success rates for the computerized algorithms, data was also gathered for
the time taken to solve a CAPTCHA. CAPTCHAs can be set to time out after a particular amount of
time has expired on a page in order to prevent computer algorithms from spending large amounts
of computation time to attack a CAPTCHA. Unfortunately, the data gathered shows that the ViolaJones algorithm works extremely quickly in solving CAPTCHAs and in every test the algorithm
solved the CAPTCHA in under 1 second. The average time taken to solve for each training data set is
shown in Table 15.
Table 15. Time Taken To Solve CAPTCHAs

Training Data
alt
alt2
default
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Time (ms)
299.98
161.04
285.66

5.4 OVERALL RESULTS
5.4.1 COMPARISON OF RESULTS
The ultimate goal of a successful CAPTCHA is to allow human access while denying the
ability to automate the defeat of the CAPTCHA. Our overall success rate across all distortion types
and all distortion levels is 71.71% human success rate versus an 11.13% computer success rate.
This success rate is compared against several other popular modern CAPTCHAS in Table 16. While
the numbers seem to be slightly lower than some other modern CAPTCHAs it is important to note
that these results are only averages from the first run of testing a wide variety of distortion types.
After removing the unsuccessful distortion types, the human success rates will increase and the
computer success rates will decrease; the purpose of discussing the overall average success is to
prove the viability of a face-detection CAPTCHA.
Table 16. Comparison of Human and Computer Success Rates

CAPTCHA
Microsoft
Baffletext
Handwritten
Kleuver Video
ASIRRA
Day Face-Detection

Type
Text-based
Text-based
Text-based
Video-based
Image-based
Image-based

Human Success
90% [5]
89% [44]
76% [45]
90% [15]
99% [12]
72%

Computer Success
60% [43]
25% [44]
13% [45]
13% [15]
10% [14]
11%

In order to achieve the desired goal, it is necessary to choose distortions that result in the
highest levels of human detection and the lowest levels of computer detection. In this section we
will discuss each distortion type and give a recommendation for its place in further testing. The
combined computer and human results based on distortion type and distortion level are shown in
Table 17.
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Table 17. Success Rates of Human Vs Computer By Distortion Level and Type

Distortion
barrel
blur
closing
darken
dilation
erosion
laplacian
lighten
opening
original
periodic
piecewise
resolution
rotate
scale_x
scale_y
speckle

Distortion Level
0
Hum.
Com.

1
Hum.
69.94%
82.42%
81.29%
76.40%
78.31%
77.25%
54.68%
82.16%
82.02%

2
Com.
21.43%
16.67%
14.29%
21.43%
21.43%
16.67%
0.00%
21.43%
19.05%

Hum.
66.67%
77.78%
69.32%
67.76%
70.11%
61.54%
62.28%
74.33%
75.16%

3
Com.
11.90%
16.67%
9.52%
21.43%
19.05%
16.67%
0.00%
21.43%
19.05%

Hum.
57.66%
74.19%
68.72%
59.88%
55.47%
56.96%
71.69%
77.84%
73.86%

Com.
7.14%
16.67%
7.14%
9.52%
16.67%
16.67%
0.00%
9.52%
21.43%

80.00% 16.67%
78.82% 14.29% 72.22% 14.29%
80.72% 14.29% 74.15% 0.00%
77.60% 16.67% 81.66% 14.29%
76.16% 2.38%
70.06% 0.00% 63.83% 0.00%
80.36% 0.00% 80.53% 0.00%
79.27% 16.67% 76.10% 9.52%

67.72% 9.52%
49.65% 0.00%
78.24% 14.29%
78.35% 2.38%
50.34% 0.00%
72.97% 0.00%
45.00% 7.14%

In order to determine the best distortions to use, we look at the differences in percentages
between the human and computer based detection rates. It is also important to see how the success
rates are affected at each level of distortion to see if the computer detection scheme is affected by
the distortion. Table 18 displays a list of the distortions that are recommended and not
recommended for further use or testing. The following sections will describe the results of each
distortion and provide further insight into how each distortion should be used and why it should or
should not be used.
Table 18. Recommendations of Distortions

Recommended Not Recommended
Blur
Barrel
Closing
Darken
Laplacian
Dilation
Lighten
Erosion
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Periodic
Piecewise
Resolution
Rotate
Scale-X
Scale-Y
Speckle

Opening

5.4.2 BARREL DISTORTION
The barrel distortion performed moderately, with human success rates ranging from
57.66%-69.94%. However, the computer success rates were quite high with as high as 21.43% at
level 1 distortion and showed a direct correlation with the human success rates. The computer
rates also did not drop off significantly after any of the tested levels of distortion. The barrel
distortion is not recommended for further use.

5.4.3 BLUR DISTORTION
The blur distortion showed high human success rates ranging from 82.42% to 74.19%, and
a computer success rate of 16.67% for all levels of distortion. The blur distortion on its own does
not distort the image content greatly enough even under extremely high levels of distortion. With
the high human success rates, the blur distortion definitely has its place in further testing, but
would most likely need to be combined with additional forms of distortion to stop computerized
detection.

5.4.4 CLOSING OPERATION
The closing operation performed well at level 1, with an 81.69% success rate, but dropped
off significantly under distortion levels 2 and 3. The computer-based results were moderate and
showed a direct correlation to the human results. If a low level of distortion is used, the closing
operation may be combined with another operation for improved results.
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5.4.5 DARKENING/DILATION/EROSION DISTORTION
All three of these operations had far too high of computer success rates to be useable. At
higher levels of distortion, the computerized detection may be defeated, but the human success
rates would be far too low to be acceptable. These operations therefore are not recommended for
further testing.

5.4.6 LAPLACIAN FILTERING
The Laplacian filtering at level 3 also performed among the best results. The greater the
number of displayed edges, the greater the corresponding human results. The drastic changes that
this filtering causes completely defeated the computer based scheme, but led to very good human
detection under the correct settings. With further changes to the filtering and additional
preprocessing, the Laplacian filtering also has room for improvement. This distortion-type should
definitely have a place in further testing and use.

5.4.7 LIGHTENING DISTORTION
At distortion levels 1 and 2, the lightening distortion had a computerized success rate of
21.43%, which is far too high for use in a CAPTCHA system. At level 3, the lightening operation
yielded among the highest human and lowest computer-based success rates. The lightening
operation has a definite place in further use, but needs to be used under high levels and possibly in
combination with other distortions.

5.4.8 OPENING
The opening operation did not show any significant drop in computer-based detection rates
under increased levels of distortion. The computer detection scheme seems unaffected by this type
of distortion and should not be used in further testing.
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5.4.9 PERIODIC
The periodic distortion performed moderately, with average levels of both human and
computer based distortion. At the level 1 distortion, the periodic distortion showed a 78.82%
human success rate and a 14.29% computer success rate. For further use, the distortion should be
used at lower levels of distortion as at higher levels the human success rates dropped below
desirable levels. This distortion could also be combined with other distortions in an attempt to
lower the computer success rate.

5.4.10 PIECEWISE
The piecewise distortion was detectable by the computer-based algorithms only at level 1
distortion. Beyond this level, the face images were undetectable. At level 3, the distortion was too
great and brought the human-based success to under 50%. If the piecewise distortion is used in the
future, the amount of distortion should either be set at level 2, or at a value in between level 1 and
level 2.

5.4.11 RESOLUTION
The resolution distortion showed quite interesting results, with the human results for level
2 being higher than the results for level 1. Additionally, the computer scheme seemed unaffected by
the increasing levels of distortion. At level 3, the human success rate was 78.24%; the distortion
level should be increased in further testing to see if human success rate can be maintained with a
decrease in the computer success rate.

5.4.12 ROTATE
The rotation distortion performed quite well with extremely low computer detection rates
and higher human success rates. Although the computer results are low, it is highly likely that
algorithms could easily be designed to defeat a distortion scheme based solely on rotation.
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Therefore the rotation distortion should be used in further testing, but most likely only combined
with other levels of distortion.

5.4.13 SCALE-X
Although the scale-x distortion completely defeated the computer face detection algorithm,
it performed only moderately at human detection. This distortion should be tested at lower levels
to see if the human detection can be improved without any improvement to the computer
detection.

5.4.14 SCALE-Y
The best distortion was found to be the scale-y at distortion level 2 with an 80.5% human
success rate and 0% computer success rate. The computer was unable to detect the distortion at all
levels of distortion. The distortion is recommended for further use.

5.4.15 SPECKLE
The speckle distortion showed one of the greatest decreases in human detection rates at higher
levels, with the lowest overall human success rate of 45% at level 3 distortion. The level 1 and 2
distortions showed moderate computer success rates, with fairly high human success rates. The
increase from level 2 to 3 reduced the human success rate from 76.10% to 45% while only reducing
the computer success rate from 9.52% to 7.14%. It is recommended that the speckle filtering only
be used under light levels and possibly combined with additional distortions.
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Chapter 6
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
We have designed a new CAPTCHA system based on the concept of human versus computer
face detection. The CAPTCHA works by presenting a series of distorted face and non-face images to
the user and requiring the user to click on all present faces. The system improves upon the textbased CAPTCHAs by providing a more versatile language independent interface and an easier-touse clickable interface, which can be easily expanded onto mobile platforms. The image-based
CAPTCHA also helps in preventing many common text-based attacks such as optical character
recognition. Our design is also an improvement over common image-based CAPTCHAs that involve
the use of labeling as these systems often have many issues regarding object ambiguity. In testing
we have determined the distortions which have the least effect on humans and greatest effect on
computers, which is useful not only for future improvements on face detection CAPTCHAs, but for
other applications which involve the use of face detection. Potential future work for this type of
CAPTCHA system includes testing a larger dataset with a smaller number of distortions. With the
use of sixteen distortions and three levels of each distortion, forty-eight different CAPTCHAs were
needed to properly test even a single generated CAPTCHA. The results of testing proved that
certain distortion types were relatively ineffective and showed the required levels for each type of
distortion to be effective. This allows future work to not require different levels of distortion and a
smaller set of actual distortions. Another potential extension would be to test the effects of multiple
types of distortion in an effort to look for unchanged human success rates and a decrease in
computer success rates. Additionally, there is room for improvement in computer detection
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deterrence in the aspect of adding patterns to the generated backgrounds to make the success of
face-detection algorithms even lower.
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